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FROM TRANSNATIONAL PROTEST TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITIES: INSIGHTS FROM THE DEBT 
CANCELLATION CAMPAIGNi
 
Daphne Josselin 
[Social Movement Studies, forthcoming] 
 
Of the transnational advocacy campaigns so far leveled at international financial 
institutions and practices, that to reduce the debt owed to creditor country 
governments and multilateral financial institutions has often been presented as the 
most successful. Building on the work of Eurodad and others, from 1997 onwards 
activists led by Jubilee 2000 UK rallied around the goal of a one-time cancellation of 
the 'unpayable' debts of the world’s poorest countries by the end of the year 2000. The 
campaign soon became global, with the creation of some 57 national Jubilee 2000 
networks. By the time it folded, at the end of 2000, over 24 million signatures had 
been gathered in support of debt cancellation. While the goal of complete debt 
cancellation remained elusive, the anti-debt network could be credited with raising 
public awareness around the issue and placing it on the agenda of creditor 
governments and international financial institutions (Donnelly 2002; Fogarty 2003).ii  
Yet the overall success of the debt cancellation campaign masked significant 
national differences, even between neighboring countries: while 2,960,262 persons 
signed the Jubilee 2000 petition in the UK, only 1,200,381 did so in Germany, and 
521,319 in France (respectively 4.97, 1.45 and 0.87 percent of the national 
population). The organization and timing of the campaigns also differed: two years 
after its London creation in October 1997, the Jubilee 2000 Coalition had sprouted 
similar organizations in five of the G7 members; Germany was an early joiner,  
France among the two exceptions.iii Why did debt cancellation achieve such 
 
 
prominence in the UK and, albeit to a lesser extent, Germany, while remaining a 
marginal issue in French associational and political circles? This is what this paper 
investigates, in the process drawing a picture of transnational activism in which the 
national is given pride of place. 
 
FROM TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
In recent years, a rapidly expanding literature has focused on the emergence of cross-
border activism, seen as a direct or indirect response to globalization (e.g. Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte and Williams 2000; Fiorini 2000; Khagram 
2002; Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2005; della Porta and Tarrow 2005). However it is 
only recently that attention has turned to the mechanisms whereby macro structures 
and changes might translate into actual mobilization (see notably Ancelovici 2002; 
Giugni 2002; Tarrow 2002; Johnson and McCarthy 2005; Kolb 2005). These 
mechanisms matter: while growing transnational linkages may create the objective 
reasons for and conditions of a rise in transnational activism, they cannot on their own 
explain why cross-border mobilization actually takes place. As social movement 
theorists remind us, three obstacles must be contended with: 'the weakness or absence 
of social networks outside people's neighborhoods, towns, cities, social groups, and 
political allegiances; the weakness or absence of transnational collective identities; 
and the absence of mechanisms to compete with the political opportunities of national 
polities' (Tarrow 2001, 14). Focusing on global civil society or transnational advocacy 
networks can further obscure the fact that oftentimes the message and tactics being 
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spread across borders developed within a particular domestic setting, and might not 
thrive on foreign soil. To better grasp the extent and dynamics of cross-national 
activism, one must therefore take a closer look at the micro sociological mechanisms 
affecting the behavior of societal and political actors at the domestic level. A 
comparative approach can yield valuable insights. 
Following a triptych well established among students of societal mobilization, 
work on the cross-national diffusion of protest has typically underlined three types of 
conditions: the existence of mobilizing structures; cultural proximity or similarity; and 
favorable political opportunities (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni 1995, 
188-91; Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997; Tarrow 1998). It is the latter that is 
privileged here. The notion of 'political opportunity structure' (POS) can be defined as 
those 'dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to 
undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success and failure' 
(Tarrow 1998: 85). In their more static form, political opportunity structures generally 
refer to different levels of institutional access to policy makers, which alter the 
likelihood of protest (e.g. Kitschelt 1986). However political opportunity structures 
can also be determined by changing political environments, in which elected officials 
and political oppositions can both mediate the impact of transnational activism. In 
some cases, new political opportunities can even be seized upon by challengers and 
used to pry open institutional barriers. Unstable political alignments, divided elites, 
influential allies and support groups all become critical aspects of political 
opportunity (Tarrow 1998: 78-80).  Last, political opportunity structures possess a 
cultural dimension since political opportunity may depend less on objective facts than 
on actors' perceptions that chances of success are opening up (Gamson and Meyer 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1996; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). 
 While acknowledging that institutional access and shifting political 
environments may exert a significant impact on domestic mobilizations, it is this latter 
dimension that we wish to explore here from two different angles, both comparatively 
understudied in the context of global activism. The first concerns the effects of 
emulation and competition between different groups of domestic activists, as these 
can both expand and limit perceived political opportunities. On the one hand, past or 
concomitant social movement activity may exert a 'structural' impact on existing 
political opportunity structures by encouraging mobilization through a demonstration 
effect (Kitschelt 1986: 62). In the case of past movements, there may even be 
organizational remnants in the domestic political environment, ‘holdovers’ that will 
provide the necessary social underpinning for future action (Almeida 2003: 350). On 
the other hand, scholars working at the border between POS and cultural approaches 
to mobilization have argued that the success of a particular movement will depend on 
the congruence of its mobilizing message with that of the ‘master frame’ shaping the 
whole cycle of protest within a given polity (Snow and Benford 1992; Diani 1996). 
By helping to define which issues and repertoires have the greatest mobilization 
potential in the national context, past or concomitant movements may thus enhance or 
reduce activists’ ability to take advantage of perceived changes in the political 
opportunity structure, such as greater institutional access, divided elites or 
international openness. Not only can ‘objective’ opportunities be missed; the scope 
for constructing, by rhetorical means, new political opportunities may also be 
reduced. 
In the case of transnational protests, perceived political opportunities are also 
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bound to be affected by multilevel decision-making and activism. In one of few 
attempts to factor in the interactions between international and domestic governance, 
Kathryn Sikkink looks at international opportunity structures, i.e. ‘the degree of 
openness of international institutions to the participation of transnational NGOS, 
networks and coalitions’ (Sikkink 2005: 156). Combining international openness with 
national openness helps account for differentiated patterns of activism around 
transnational issues. For instance, closure in both political arenas is likely to 
discourage mobilization; however a combination of international closure and 
domestic openness should result in ‘defensive transnationalization’. This time, 
activists will engage in a broad repertoire of political activities at the domestic level, 
and try through their impact on domestic governments to gain more access to 
international institutions. By the same token, David Meyer suggests looking at how 
domestic political opportunity structures are 'nested' within their larger international 
environment, and how changes in the international context, or perceptions thereof, can 
alter the opportunities for activists within domestic settings (Meyer 2003). 
International institutions and regimes provide not only targets but, most significantly, 
arenas for social movement activity. Heads of state may successfully take advantage 
of international gatherings to press a new agenda, giving a previously remote policy 
area increased visibility and opening up new opportunities (or perceptions thereof) at 
the domestic level. Cross-border protests may provide focal points for activists, 
officials and the media, fostering new interorganizational ties and giving added 
publicity, even legitimacy to national actors (Kolb 2005). The way domestic political 
opportunities interact with international access and transnational events cannot be 
overlooked. 
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 In the end, four aspects of domestic political opportunity structures are 
therefore explored here: domestic institutional access; changing political environment; 
impact of past or concomitant movement activity; interactions with international 
opportunities. By establishing how well these account for differences in the scope, 
timing and dynamics of the 1990s campaign for the cancellation of poor country debt 
in our three countries, we hope to better assess their relative contribution to our 
understanding of cross-border protests. The next section takes a closer look at the 
three domestic campaigns. In a fourth section, explanations relating to the specific 
political settings in which the campaigns took place are suggested. A fifth section 
concludes. 
 
THE DEBT CANCELLATION CAMPAIGN: NATIONAL INSIGHTS 
 
Before presenting the three domestic campaigns, a few words on the transnational 
dimension of the anti-debt protest are in order. As mentioned in the introduction, the 
Jubilee 2000 campaign rapidly established itself as the epitome of successful cross-
border campaigns in the area of international finance. The coalitions that were 
fostered in well over fifty countries encompassed churches, anti-poverty groups, trade 
unions and a myriad of other organizations, many of which had not worked on debt 
issues before. Campaigners targeted a network of creditor countries and international 
financial institutions previously thought to be largely impervious to external 
influence, yet managed to extract commitments and actual (if sometimes limited) 
policy changes. In accounting for this overall success, ‘global’ elements have often 
been emphasized: the role of the internet in enabling collaboration within and across 
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countries; that of the news media in spreading awareness and achieving maximum 
leverage from celebrity involvement; the focus on G7 Summits and IMF/World Bank 
annual meetings. Yet another, equally striking ingredient of the campaign was the 
autonomy left to national coalitions, each of which created its own decision-making 
structure, and to member organizations within. Tensions were rife: between South and 
North, reformists and radicals, even at times between the UK coalition and others 
(notably the US) over perceived efforts to assert global leadership around the 
campaign (see in particular Donnelly 2000). But crucially (perhaps inevitably) the 
transnational network underpinning the protest remained highly decentralized, 
functioning as a coalition of autonomous campaigns. It is this national dimension that 
we want to capture here, by looking at patterns of mobilization in three creditor 
countries: Britain, Germany and France. 
 
Britain: the irrepressible Jubilee 2000 Coalition 
 
The Jubilee 2000 Coalition grew out of an alliance of aid agencies, the Debt Crisis 
Network (DCN), led by the New Economics Foundation, Christian Aid and the World 
Development Movement, which had been working on the debt issue since the 
Mexican debt crisis of 1982 (Pettifor 1998; Dent 1999). While many secular 
organizations eventually joined the movement, including trade unions, much of the 
initial impetus and financial backing behind the initiative came from Christian 
agencies: Christian Aid, CAFOD and Tearfund, all members of Eurodad.iv The very 
name of the campaign linked the Biblical concept of Jubilee with the approaching 
Millennium. A small office was set up in 1996, and in October 1997, the Jubilee 2000 
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Coalition, counting around 70 members, was launched in the Grand Committee room 
of the House of Commons.  
The coalition soon proved its reach, with the organization of a 70,000 strong 
‘human chain’ during the May 1998 Birmingham Summit, following which Prime 
Minister Tony Blair paid ‘tribute to the Jubilee 2000 Campaign and its dignified 
breaking-the-chain demonstration' in a speech to the House of Commons. In February 
1999, the intervention of U2 singer Bono and boxing champion Muhammad Ali at the 
Brit Awards gave the campaign a new publicity boost: not only did all major British 
papers give the event extensive coverage, the Express officially endorsed the 
campaign. In June, as the Cologne Summit was being convened, more initiatives 
followed with the screening on prime time television of Comic Relief's anti-debt show 
and the organization of a new human chain of over 30,000 people along the banks of 
the Thames, which once again received significant media coverage. 
Throughout, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown's ringing 
endorsements of the anti-debt campaign provided further visibility. In February 1999, 
an article co-written with International Development Secretary Clare Short pressed for 
urgent action and announced Britain had proposed to the G7 finance ministers 'new 
and more challenging targets for wiping out more debt' (The Guardian, 22 February 
1999). On 7 March 1999, addressing a Jubilee 2000 public meeting in St Paul’s 
Cathedral, the Chancellor described poor country debt as ‘the greatest single cause of 
poverty and injustice across the earth and potentially one of the greatest threats to 
peace‘, as well as ‘the great moral issue of this day and this decade‘, adding ‘we must 
cut the debt and do so now’, and ‘I say to the churches and to all who support Jubilee 
2000 - as I do - we thank you’. In December, the Chancellor announced that Britain 
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would cancel 100 percent of debts owed to it by 26 countries by the end of 2000. By 
then, a thriving Jubilee 2000 Group had also developed among MPs of all political 
persuasions (Dent 1999: 35). 
With member organizations now numbering over 160, campaigners’ efforts 
continued throughout the year 2000, with events such as ‘Red letter day on Third 
World Debt‘, which saw 8000 letters being delivered to 10 Downing Street and G7 
embassies on 3 June; the launch of a widespread e-mail action by stars and 
campaigners at the end of June; and demonstrations by Christian Aid activists wearing 
Tony Blair masks at the end of July. The extensive media coverage paid off: in June 
2000, a CAFOD survey by MORI showed that 50 percent of respondents recognized 
the name ‘Jubilee 2000’. By the end of the year, the British public had contributed 
2,960,262 signatures to the Jubilee 2000 Petition.  
All the while the British government reaffirmed its commitment: in July, 
Gordon Brown proposed a ‘debt relief for peace’ initiative. In September a meeting 
was organized between campaigners, IMF Managing Director Horst Köhler and the 
British government. On 2 December, the Chancellor announced that Britain would 
stop taking debt repayments from the 41 poorest countries.  
As the Jubilee 2000 UK coalition reached its Millennium deadline, on 2 
December 2000, new initiatives were announced. Director Ann Pettifor would head 
Jubilee+, a support unit for campaigns on international debt and finance based at the 
New Economics Foundation. Deputy Director Adrian Lovett would lead the Drop the 
Debt campaign to target the 2001 Genoa Summit. UK-based organizations including 
CAFOD, Christian Aid and Tearfund would continue to coordinate policy and activity 
on debt cancellation as part of a Debt Network. In March 2001, Jubilee Debt 
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Campaign (JDC) became the successor to Jubilee 2000 UK and Drop the Debt. 
Comprising a similarly broad range of  around 130 partner organizations, it has 
focused strongly on the UK government and parliament.  
Yet to some extent Jubilee 2000 UK was victim of its own success. By 2003, 
the organization of a World Debt Day to commemorate the 1998 Birmingham Summit 
only attracted some 2000 campaigners, with media coverage only by the Guardian; 
and while Sir Bob Geldof was happy to attend, Gordon Brown addressed the 
gathering by pre-recorded video. The political impetus was not altogether lost 
however, as showed by the Chancellor’s announcement in September 2004 that 
Britain would pay off 10 per cent of the money owed by 32 of the world’s poorest 
countries to the World Bank and the African Development Bank (The Guardian, 24 
September 2004). 
 
Germany: up and down 
 
The German arm of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, Erlassjahr 2000, was set up in 
September 1997. During the year 1998, membership increased very sharply, from the 
original 47 organizations to over 700. These were mostly church-related grassroots 
bodies, though a growing number of nationwide organizations, both religious and 
secular, joined the campaign. Especially significant was the backing of Misereor, the 
German Catholic bishops’ organization for development cooperation and main 
financial support of the campaign, and of WEED (World economy, Ecology and 
Development), whose annual debt report (published since 1994) proved a central 
instrument for raising awareness among the German public. February 1998 saw the 
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first of several postcard campaigns, with thousands of postcards sent to Bonn on the 
45th anniversary of the cancellation of Germany’s wartime debts. In May, German 
activists took part in the British human chain (Pettifor 1998: 116).  
Soon after his election in October 1998, SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
declared in the Bundestag that the German government would present an initiative on 
debt at the Cologne Summit, thus breaking with a longstanding German opposition to 
debt cancellation. New Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Heidemarie Wieczoreck-Zeul (also known as ‘Rote Heidi’ for her left wing positions 
within the SPD) further emphasized that debt cancellation had become a high priority 
issue for the German government (Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 December 1998). On 27 
January 1999, in a personal article written in the Financial Times, Chancellor 
Schröder declared that ‘it is clear that without a radical debt reduction in many of the 
poorest countries there is no hope of bringing about a fresh start’, and proposed new 
initiatives in that direction, including the complete cancellation of debts from ODA 
for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs).  The initiative was hailed by Jubilee 
2000 supporters as ‘a fantastic success […] Germany are no longer the bad guys – and 
no other country can use them as an excuse for inaction’ (Adrian Lovett of Jubilee 
2000, The Guardian, 22 January 1999). Erlassjahr 2000 announced it would organize 
it own human chain on the occasion of the forthcoming Cologne Summit 
By May 1999, Erlassjahr 2000’s membership had climbed to 1600 
organizations. On 12 June 1999, an information vigil was organized in Frankfurt, and 
on 19 June, the promised human chain was formed in Cologne, with 35,000 
participants. That same day, also the occasion of the protestant church day, a 15,000 
strong demonstration took place in Stuttgart. The Jubilee 2000 petition was handed 
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over to Chancellor Schröder, in the presence of the Honduran Bishop Oscar 
Rodriguez (patron of Erlassjahr 2000) and the ubiquitous Bono. In June, Ms 
Wieczoreck-Zeul expressed the federal government’s gratefulness for Erlassjahr 
2000’s support around the debt initiative (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 June 
1999). A few months later, Uschi Eid, parliamentarian State Secretary at the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), insisted once again 
that the campaign had been instrumental to the launch of the Chancellor’s debt 
initiative (Die Tageszeitung, 27 November 1999). 
In December 1999, Erlassjahr 2000’s membership peaked at almost 2000 
organizations. Yet disappointment with the federal government was becoming 
manifest, Jürgen Kaiser, the political coordinator of the campaign (and a member of 
Eurodad’s executive board) deploring the lack of commitment demonstrated by the 
government after the promising January start (press release, 31 December 1999). Still 
intent on keeping the issue alive, in the run-up to the Okinawa Summit Erlassjahr 
2000 began an information campaign on the debt issue. In May 2000, on the occasion 
of the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister, another information vigil was organized in 
front of the Bunzelkanzleramt; a couple of months later the initiative was repeated, 
this time in front of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Gedächtniskirche in Berlin. Yet at Okinawa it 
became clear that Chancellor Schröder was reluctant to support more debt 
cancellation, declaring ‘It does not make sense to support those who do not know 
what to do with our help’ (Handelsblatt, 24 July 2000). This hardening of the German 
official position was confirmed in later years.v This the activists soon criticized 
vigorously, as they did Germany’s slow compliance with the Cologne resolutions 
(Actionaid, Eurodad and Oxfam 2005). Still, the campaign continued: during the 
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October 2000 IMF-World Bank meeting in Prague, Erlassjahr 2000 co-organized the 
demonstration and representatives handed several thousand postcards to Mr Diller, 
State Secretary of the German Finance Ministry.  
In July 2001, Erlassjahr 2000 became Erlassjahr.de. Tellingly, only 400 of 
Erlassjahr 2000’ organizations initially extended their membership to the new 
alliance. By March 2002 the figure had risen to 700, still a far cry from the Erlassjahr 
2000’s peak membership of December 1999. As for media coverage, a survey of the 
number of articles published on different German social movement organizations in 
the Tageszeitung between January 2000 and December 2002 concluded that reporting 
on Erlassjahr 2000 had been so infrequent it had to be grouped with that on radical 
activists in the category ‘others’ (Kolb 2005: 113). Efforts continued however, with a 
new postcard campaign targeted at Finance Minister Hans Eichel and Chair of the 
Bundestag’s Finance Committee Christine Scheel in June 2002. Over 20,000 
signatures were also collected on a petition in favor of a new, more transparent debt 
relief process. In May 2003, on the occasion of the ecumenical church day in Berlin, 
Erlassjahr.de joined forces with the Aktionbündnis gegen AIDS (action alliance 
against aid) to organize a 5,000 strong demonstration on the debt issue. By 
September, membership had risen again to 1000. The petition for a fairer debt process 
continued to circulate into 2004, notably through a two weeks ‘Fairness Tour’ across 
Germany, collecting 150,000 signatures, and was finally handed to Heidemarie 
Wieczoreck-Zeul in May 2004. 
 
France: a belated and limited mobilization  
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Having failed to show up at Birmingham in May 1998, one observer pointing to their 
conspicuous under-representation (Pettifor 1998: 116), French activists began 
circulating the Jubilee 2000 Petition in November 1998, via the campaign 'Pour l'an 
2000: annulons la dette' organised by the Comité d'action catholique contre la faim et 
pour le développement (CCFD). Between February and June 1999, Agir Ici, AITEC 
and the CRID further made the campaign the first one of their newly created network, 
‘Pour une réforme des institutions financières‘ (IFI). By mid-1999, around 60 NGOs 
had been mobilized, many of them religious, leading a British observer to conclude 
'Even in Camdessus's France, the new Jubilee 2000 organization appears to be getting 
off the ground' (Peters 1999: 188). Falling in line with fellow British and German 
leaders, Socialist Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn declared the time had 
come ‘to abandon the politics of small steps’ in the creditor response to the debt crisis 
and suggested countries eligible under the HIPC initiative should pay no interest on 
their aid debts for a generation. When on 14 June 1999, a few days before the 
Cologne Summit, Dominique Strauss-Kahn and Cooperation Minister Charles 
Josselin received representatives from the associations involved, around 520,000 
signatures had been collected. Campaign organizers further claimed to be engaged in 
a dialogue with the French government over the issue, and notably over the use of the 
funds to be freed by debt alleviation (Les Nouvelles de la Dette, 7 September 1999).  
However the aftermath of the Cologne Summit marked a low point for anti-
debt campaigners. The rise of a new campaign on reforming international financial 
institutions on the agenda of the IFI network meant the issue became less prominent. 
Few signatures were added to the still circulating Jubilee 2000 petition - the final 
count in 2000 would show 521,319 French signatures. Significantly, French officials 
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refused to set up follow up meetings despite written solicitations (Les Nouvelles de la 
Dette, 19 December 1999).  
The coalition then found a new impetus. Having first declared its interest in 
the Jubilee 2000 campaign during its June 1999 Journées Mondiales, high-profile 
movement ATTAC began mentioning debt cancellation among its rapidly multiplying 
objectives. From January 2000 trade unions CFDT, CFTC and CGT also became 
involved in the campaign. New events followed. On 12 April 2000, the organization 
of the first anti-debt demonstration took place in Paris, targeting the Finance Ministry-
hosted Paris Club.vi Coordinated by the CCFD, but with the active involvement of 
ATTAC, it reportedly gathered ‘hundreds‘ of protesters, admittedly a meager result 
compared with the scale of similar initiatives across the Channel but for some 
observers a ‘symbolic first‘, and one that saw a delegation of campaigners being 
received by Paris Club Vice-President Philippe de Fontaine-Vive. That same month, 
France agreed to cancel 100 percent of the public debt owed by the 12 countries of the 
zone franc eligible under the HIPC initiative. In June, to celebrate the first anniversary 
of the Cologne Summit, prefectures throughout France were targeted by campaigners 
(the initiative was repeated in 2001 and 2002). 
Emulating similar developments abroad, a new 'platform', Dette & 
Développement, was set up in March 2001. Still coordinated by the CCFD, it counted 
among its 26 members religious organizations and trade unions, alongside NGOs and 
activist movements. Also involved in the platform was the emerging CADTM-France, 
signaling that twelve years after the creation of the radical, Brussels-based anti-debt 
network, France was finally ‘ripe’ for action.vii  
In July and August 2001, in a series of open letters, President of ATTAC 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bernard Cassen challenged presidential candidates Lionel Jospin and Jacques Chirac 
to take position on the Tobin tax and debt cancellation. In October, a BVA poll 
commissioned by the CCFD suggested that 59 percent of the French public believed 
developed countries did not make enough efforts in the area of debt relief, with 
support for additional measures especially strong among the Left, the Greens and the 
center-right UDF. By January 2002, party leaders expressing support for the 
cancellation of third world debt ranged from Front National Jean-Marie Le Pen to 
Lutte Ouvrière’s Arlette Laguiller through to UDF François Bayrou and PS François 
Hollande.  
Efforts to promote debt relief continued beyond the 2002 elections and the 
arrival of a right-wing majority. In June 2002, ATTAC joined others within Dette & 
Dévelopment to ask the government once again to support debt cancellation within 
the G8; on 19 June, another protest was organized in Paris. In the run up to the June 
2003 Evian-Les-Bains Summit, ATTAC launched a new campaign around the sale of 
rap CD 'ATTAC ta dette', in a clear effort to mobilize young publics. So did Dette & 
Développement with the release, in late January 2003, of world music CD ‘Drop the 
Debt’. As the Summit itself was taking place, a European march against debt was 
organized. Debt cancellation thus continued to 'surf' the altermondialiste wave, never 
the key issue but a significant background leitmotiv nonetheless. 
 
 
EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCES 
 
When comparing the British, German and French campaigns in favor of debt 
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cancellation, several things stand out. First, the relatively modest scope of French 
efforts compared to British and German ones in terms of both public and media 
endorsement. The Jubilee 2000 Petition attracted slightly over half a million 
signatures in France, versus nearly one and half million in Germany and three 
millions in the UK;  the few demonstrations organized by Dette & Développement 
involved a few hundreds of protesters at best, and generated limited media interest, as 
did the rest of the campaign. In stark contrast, the British campaign was actively 
endorsed by rock stars and sporting legends, broadcast on prime time TV and well 
covered in the press. And while the German campaign lacked the scope and glamour 
of the British one, it got extensive media coverage both before and after the Cologne 
Summit. 
A second difference lies in the timing of the mobilization of both societal and 
political actors around the issue. Whereas the Jubilee UK coalition was already in full 
swing by 1998, most visibly around the Birmingham Summit, with Erlassjahr 2000 
following closely behind, the French campaign remained relatively low key until 
1999;  the first protest only took place in April 2000, a few months from the 
announced Millennium deadline. By the same token, the Jubilee 2000 campaign was 
widely endorsed by the British political establishment almost from its inception. 
German politicians also signaled an early U-turn in the run-up to Cologne, when the 
SPD leadership came up in favor of the campaign. By contrast, few French political 
figures mentioned the debt issue before 2001. 
 Finally, the dynamics of the three campaigns differ: in Britain, mobilization 
appeared sustained from the Birmingham Summit of May 1998 right on to the 
Millennium deadline. It is only after 2001 that interest in the issue began to wane, and 
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even then the successor movement to Jubilee 2000 UK retained a broad membership. 
In Germany, decline set in earlier, in 2000; by the time Erlassjahr 2000 became 
Erlassjahr.de in July 2001, membership had already dropped, along with public 
interest. In France, mobilization is best described as intermittent, with feeble ‘peaks’ 
in the run up to Cologne, the Spring of 2000, the Autumn of 2001 and the run-up to 
the 2003 Evian-Les-Bains Summit. In trying to account for these features of the three 
anti-debt campaigns, one can return to the four dimensions of domestic political 
opportunity structures already underlined.  
 
Institutional access 
 
Among the differences often pointed out in the comparative politics literature on the 
three countries, those relating to institutional access, and especially the way 
authorities have traditionally dealt with challengers, figure quite prominently. In 
Britain, inclusive strategies have generally prevailed, albeit of an informal nature. In 
Germany, despite an overall exclusive strategy challengers could count on some 
formal access, an important element behind the success of the new social movements. 
In France however, 'selective exclusion' has been the rule, the state only settling for 
substantive concessions if the social movement's demands happened to correspond to 
the political goals of the governing coalition. This, according to social movement 
theorists, generally discouraged broad mobilization (Kriesi et al. 1995: 36).  
Responses to anti-debt coalitions seemed to fit these general patterns. Contacts 
between British debt campaigners and institutional/political actors were sustained 
from an early stage. As the campaign unfolded, co-founder of Jubilee 2000 Martin 
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Dent wrote that 'A great deal of dialogue is taking place with MPs and MEPs, with the 
Treasury, with the Department for International Development (DFID)', adding: 'It is 
impressive to see how MPs of different parties who disagree on many other issues 
combine in this great cause' (Dent 1999: 35). Christian Aid and CAFOD concurred, 
later claiming regular contact with DFID on the issue. Contacts were further 
formalized when, following the White Paper on International Development of 
November 1997, the 1998 Development Policy Forum was set up to promote more 
effective consultation on development issues. As could be expected, the biggest single 
group of participants came from development NGOs and debt relief was one of the 
main issues debated. 
 Contacts also existed between the federal government and the members of 
Erlassjahr 2000, thanks in no small part to the major and long-standing role played by 
civil society groups in development assistance. In the late 1990s, German 
development NGOs received 6 percent of Official Development Assistance (ODA), 
compared with  3 percent in Britain and under one percent in France. Christian 
organizations Kindernothilfe, World Vision Germany and Misereor were key 
beneficiaries.viii  Informal ties were also established: in February 1998, Dr Erhard 
Eppler, former Minister for Economic Cooperation, became a patron of the campaign; 
and in the run up to the 1998 Birmingham Summit, Erlassjahr representatives met 
with Dr Jürgen Stark, a senior official in the Ministry of Finance.  
 By contrast, until the early 2000s, institutional access for French debt 
campaigners remained limited. The two lead actors on debt relief were the Elysée (for 
general impetus) and the Direction du Trésor of the Finance Ministry, host to the Paris 
Club and responsible for the bulk of debt treatment operations through the special 
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Treasury accounts. Neither seemed particularly keen to consult with civil society 
representatives on the issue, despite a few encouraging signs in the run up to the 
Cologne Summit. Things then appeared to change. In April 2000, even as the first 
protest was being organized in the streets of Paris, a working group on debt relief and 
development involving debt relief campaigners alongside the Trésor was established 
within the Commission Coopération Développement of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. 
In January 2002, an Observatoire de la participation de la France au processus 
d’allègement de la dette des pays pauvres was set up by the Haut Conseil de la 
Coopération Internationale (HCCI) and Dette & Développement to monitor the 
implementation of bilateral and multilateral debt relief initiatives. The initiative was 
short-lived however, the Observatoire disappearing a mere few months after its 
creation under the new Raffarin government.   
 
Changing political environment  
 
Asked to comment on the (comparatively) poor success of the campaign on French 
soil, Jubilee ambassador extraordinaire Bono simply concluded that ‘in France the 
debt issue receives limited media coverage because France has much to lose.’ 
(Libération, 9 October 2000). By 1999, the 41 HIPC candidates owed France $11.5bn 
at face value, versus $4.9bn for Germany and $2.4bn for Britain.ix Even more 
significantly – after all, France had nonetheless championed debt alleviation in the 
recent past (Roberge 1988),  French policy-makers faced the necessity to meet the 
stringent budget criterion set up in the Maastricht Treaty and restated in the Growth 
and Stability Pact. One could therefore expect French officials to show greater 
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reluctance to endorse the campaign’s goals than either their British or German 
counterparts. 
However the pressure was also strong on Germany: upon coming to power, 
the new government had pledged to balance the Federal Budget by 2006. With 
economic slowdown and East-West discrepancies weighting heavily on domestic 
budgetary items, the relative cost of deeper debt relief was by no means negligible. 
Moreover, the German government had a longstanding position on debt relief and its 
proposed financing to defend, the Bundesbank having consistently opposed the sale of 
IMF gold for that purpose. Yet in Germany, like in Britain, the arrival of leftwing 
governments gave the campaign a major impetus.  
In the UK, the support of Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown proved 
especially critical. In September 1997, shortly before the creation of the Jubilee 2000 
Coalition and, according to activists, partly in response to representations made to 
him, Chancellor Brown launched the Commonwealth Debt Initiative.x He later proved 
passionate in his support for Jubilee 2000, famously paying tribute to his father, a 
Church of Scotland minister, as he described third world debt relief as a moral issue 
(The Guardian, 11 May 1999), and repeatedly endorsing the movement's goals. He 
relentlessly pressed his G7 colleagues on the matter, tabling key proposals in advance 
of most summits. The Jubilee 2000 campaign thus provides a striking illustration of 
the role played by state actors as institutional allies in cross-border campaigns, an 
aspect often overlooked in empirical work (Tarrow 2002: 22).  
In its early years, the German 'Red-Green' coalition also showed ‘a clear and 
unprecedented commitment to the issue of development cooperation and poverty 
reduction’ (DAC 2001: 20). The impact of this policy shift was keenly felt by anti-
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debt activists, as reported by left-leaning Erlassjahr member WEED: ‘The change of 
national government in 1998 provided a new context for WEED’s work’ (Eurodad 
1999: 27). As the new government of Social Democrats and Greens – the latter 
longstanding supporters of poor country debt relief – took a more proactive stance in 
the discussion on debt reduction, Erlassjahr representatives repeatedly emphasized 
their contribution to shaping the German position, leading to the German debt 
initiative of January 1999. Conversely, German officials were happy to acknowledge 
the role played by the coalition in bringing about progress on the debt issue, none 
more so than SPD BMZ Minister Heidemarie Wieczoreck-Zeul.  
 By contrast, in France, where a leftwing coalition had come to power in May 
1997, political support remained sparse. Socialist Finance Minister Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn rarely referred to the debt issue. When, in March 1999, he finally 
declared the time had come ‘to abandon the politics of small steps’, his opinions were 
said not to have full governmental backing (Libération, 12 March 2000). Happy to 
dwell on what was left of his domaine réservé under cohabitation, President Chirac 
was one of few to affirm his support for debt cancellation - in Okinawa in July 2000, 
in Genoa the following year, both times claiming credit for launching the HIPC 
initiative at Lyon. But debt relief (or development assistance writ large) was not seen 
as a priority by a Socialist government intent on reigning in budget deficits in the run 
up to Economic and Monetary Union (Josselin 2004).  
It is only in the months preceding the 2002 elections (parliamentary and 
presidential) that debt cancellation seemed to surface on the mainstream agenda. On 5 
October 2001, PS Secretary François Hollande called for the cancellation of the 
bilateral and multilateral debt of the poorest countries, and of part of that of emerging 
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market countries, a move widely seen as designed to occupy Jacques Chirac's territory 
and to offset Lionel Jospin's apparent lack of interest for debt relief and development 
assistance (Losson and Quinio 2002: 283). By January 2002, candidates of all 
political hues were claiming support for the cancellation of third world debt.  
 
Past and concomitant movement activity 
 
As explained above, any explanation of British, German and French participation in 
the global debt campaign must also consider the effect of emulation and competition 
among social movements. Both actors' perception of political opportunity structures 
and their ability to frame their message to maximum effect can change as a result of 
past or parallel protests. Here the British case clearly stands out. UK activism on the 
debt issue was by no means a novelty: in 1986, an Oxfam UK media campaign had 
exposed the fact that African debt repayments to Britain exceeded aid monies. The 
campaign, and subsequent efforts by the Debt Crisis Network, partly accounted for 
the April 1987 Declaration by Chancellor Lawson that the British government favored 
the cancellation of two-thirds of the principal of bilateral debt owed by the poorest 
countries and longer terms at lower interest rates to repay the remaining debts − so-
called Trinidad Terms (Donnelly 2002: 173). Significantly, the initiative was 'popular 
at home, giving Nigel Lawson a rare rave review in The Guardian, as well as 
approval by The Financial Times' (Evans 1999: 277). According to OXFAM 
organizer John Clark, the Debt Crisis Network succeeded in bringing ‘the debt crisis 
into popular culture’ (Clark 1987: 26). This might explain why, in the 1990s, the debt 
issue seemed to resonate especially strongly in the UK: in a 1996 MORI survey, third 
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world debt already came 7th in the list of Britons' top ten global concerns, versus 9th 
for Europe as a whole.xi  
 No such levels of awareness and support existed across the Channel. While no 
data could be found on French public opinion regarding debt relief prior to the Jubilee 
2000 campaign, later figures suggest that support among the French public was far 
from unambiguous: in a BVA survey dated March 2001, asked if they would support 
full, large, limited or no debt cancellation, 49 percent of respondents responded 
limited or no cancellation, and only 44 percent full or large cancellation. Aid fatigue 
may well have contributed to the low response of French publics and politicians: by 
the end of 2001, France could claim to be carrying the heaviest burden by far among 
G7 countries, with the planned cancellation of $10.3bn under HIPC. Data on aid 
policy (no separate indicators could be found for debt relief), suggest public support 
may have been even weaker in Germany. In a poll dated July 1999, 68 percent of 
respondents agreed with the statement: ‘Instead of continuously supporting other 
countries with credits and economic aid, we should invest the money in Germany’ 
(Noelle-Neumann, 2002).   
In both Germany and France, attempts were made to 'adapt' the British-
inspired frame to the domestic environment, with varying degrees of success. Like 
their British counterparts, who saw the adoption of the biblical name Jubilee 2000 as a 
key ingredient in the campaign's rapid success,xii German campaigners – many of 
them grassroots Christian organizations − were happy to emphasize the religious 
overtones of the campaign, thus appropriating  ready-made symbols and solidarities 
(Smith 1996). However, using what could be qualified as a 'rhetoric of guilt', German 
anti-debt campaigners also drew repeated parallels between the plight of poor 
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countries and that of post-war Germany, a country whose debts had been cancelled in 
1953. These efforts may well have contributed to shaking public apathy, ensuring a 
broad and swift mobilization in the early years. However, in a context of budgetary 
austerity, and with the costs of reunification still painfully apparent, public support 
proved difficult to sustain. Significantly, the emergence of ATTAC Germany and its 
shrewd use of the news media in the aftermath of the 2001 Genoa Summit may also 
have contributed to marginalizing the Erlassjahr campaign (Kolb 2005).  
In France, where the cleavage between Church and secularized state has 
retained unique political salience (Kriesi et al. 1995: 12), activists groups − many of 
them confessional − avoided references to the term 'Jubilee', opting instead for more 
neutral formulas such as  ‘Pour l'an 2000, annulons la dette’ and Dette & 
Développement. Once ATTAC had joined the campaign, in early 2000, efforts were 
also made to align its values with those of the master frame developed in the 
aftermath of the 1995 strikes, in which issues of citizen control and market regulation 
resonated more strongly than questions of equity and redistribution (Ancelovici 2002: 
432-6). Debt cancellation was largely framed as a necessary precondition for Southern 
citizens and governments to reject the diktats of the IMF-G7-commercial banks nexus 
(ATTAC 2002: 122-8), rather than as a matter of social justice or even growth and 
development per se. However, debt relief struggled to emerge as a mobilizing cause, 
and from 2000 on remained best seen as one element of a broadening altermondialiste 
agenda.   
 
International opportunities 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the coincidence between explicit political support, mobilization surges and 
G7 Summits cannot be ignored. Initially taken aback by the sheer scope of the 
Birmingham mobilization (Pettifor 1998), Labour leaders soon saw an opportunity to 
demonstrate (at relatively limited budgetary cost) both commitment to the Third 
World and international leadership. As a result, the British campaign turned into one 
of 'offensive transnationalization': operating in an open domestic political opportunity 
structure, and no doubt further encouraged by the rapid internationalization of the 
campaign, British activists used a wide range of protest and political pressure 
activities directed at the home government and, partly through it, at other international 
actors. Conversely, as stated by a key member of the coalition: 'At crucial moments 
CAFOD has mobilized sister agencies in the US, Japan, Germany and France in 
furtherance of the DFID debt position which CAFOD has shared' (DFID 2002: 3; see 
also Evans 1999: 276). British activists thus utilized their relatively congenial 
domestic environment to open up new international political opportunities, with 
significant consequences for other campaigns, not least the German one.   
 Indeed, the 1999 'U-turn' of the German government provides another, 
possibly even more striking example of intertwining domestic and international 
opportunities. Eager to establish his credentials on the world stage after the 
impressive performance of fellow left winger Tony Blair, aware of the transnational 
scope and impetus of advocacy efforts, the incoming Chancellor broke with years of 
governmental opposition to debt cancellation when he declared his intention to 
present an initiative at his first G7 Summit, and his administration provided critical 
backing to the adoption of the enhanced HIPC initiative and associated commitments 
on bilateral debt reduction, including the sale of IMF gold. In explaining Germany's 
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new stance, the arrival of a 'Red-Green' coalition must therefore be considered in 
conjunction with an impending international event (the Cologne Summit) as well as a 
transnational protest wave (that initiated around the Birmingham Summit). Domestic 
and international political opportunity structures were altered, favoring rapid German 
mobilization and policy innovation. The window of opportunity thus opened was 
short lived however: with G7 leadership passing to another (even more debt relief-
averse) country, and budgetary constraints reasserting themselves, by the time of the 
2000 Okinawa Summit, Chancellor Schröder had reverted to a much cooler posture 
and Erlassjahr 2000 had begun its decline.  
The French campaign also offers interesting insights. In the absence of 
favorable domestic political opportunities, mobilization surged only modestly and 
episodically. The run up to Cologne saw some progress, as the Birmingham-born 
wave of protest and G7 peer pressure interacted to produce new opportunities. 
Thereafter however, organizers CCFD and (from January 2000) ATTAC struggled to 
keep the campaign alive. As was showed above, it is only in the months preceding the 
2002 elections that debt cancellation seemed to finally surface on the mainstream 
political agenda. There is little doubt that the impeding elections did affect the 
domestic political opportunity structure: competition between the Socialist Prime 
Minister and the Gaullist President, both presidential candidates, became acute, and as 
Lionel Jospin tried to enter the domaine réservé of international development, debt 
relief gained in political salience. Yet we would argue that the 2001 Genoa Summit 
and World Social Forum, both of which received considerable political endorsement 
and media coverage in France, provide another piece of the jigsaw. After Genoa, no 
French political leader could ignore the 'movement for global justice', in which 
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ATTAC France was a key participant (Fougier 2002). Once again, a shifting political 
environment at home and major protests abroad interacted, enabling debt relief to 
garner political support, and debt activists to gain new institutional access. However 
neither election-induced domestic shifts nor somewhat distant (and, post 9/11, 
receding) transnational activism sufficed to affect enduringly the structure of domestic 
political opportunities, as showed by post-2002 developments.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Overall, this survey of the British, German and French anti-debt campaigns supports 
earlier calls for a better understanding of the domestic embeddedness of transnational 
activism (Tarrow 1998; Risse 2002; Ancelovici 2002; Tilly 2004). By comparing 
national campaigns, we can gain a greater feel for domestic political settings and how 
congenial these are to the birth or spread of transnational protest. Of course, other 
factors may have played a role in the mobilization processes recounted here. 
Organizational resources in particular differed, sometimes significantly.xiii Yet we 
would argue that resources alone cannot explain either the scope or the dynamics of 
the mobilizations: to take but one illustration, the yearly income of Misereor, the 
German branch of CIDSE and a key member of Erlassjahr 2000, far surpassed that of 
its British counterpart CAFOD. Still, despite humble beginnings (Pettifor 1998), the 
British coalition proved more adept at generating dedicated resources, seizing the 
political initiative and maintaining interest in the debt issue. 
Moreover, this work showed how a greater focus on the interplay between 
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domestic and international opportunities could add to our understanding of the 
success and limits of cross-border campaigns. Institutional access seemed 
significantly reduced in the French case compared to the other two, with likely 
consequences for the ability of French activists to mobilize public and politicians. Yet 
this relative lack of access could not adequately explain differences in either timing or 
dynamics. These, shifts in the domestic political environment (new coalitions in the 
British and German cases, forthcoming elections in the French one) went a long way 
towards accounting for. At the same time, their impact was best evaluated in the light 
of changing international opportunities. Not only did G7 Summits provide focal 
points and meeting places for transnational activists; they also affected domestic 
political opportunity structures and perceptions thereof, creating short-lived, but in the 
case of Germany critical, windows of opportunity.  
Finally, the importance of past or parallel social movement activity was 
apparent. Not only did it explain the different rhetoric used in the three countries; it 
was also essential in accounting for the scope, and even more the sustainability, of 
mobilization efforts. In the UK past movement activity appeared to have considerably 
broadened the appeal of (and opportunities open to) the Jubilee 2000 coalition. The 
successful Oxfam UK campaign established a precedent for both state and non-state 
actors; it left an institutional imprint in the form of the Debt Crisis Network; and, 
perhaps most importantly, it enshrined the debt issue in popular culture, defining a 
‘master frame’ Jubilee 2000 would later draw on. More generally, the 1986 campaign 
and its follow ups opened up new opportunities for debt activists by enhancing 
expectations of success. In the absence of such legacy the German and the French 
campaigns struggled to impose their frame onto largely apathetic publics and 
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officials; they also suffered from the competition of newcomer ATTAC, the message 
of which either blurred or marginalized their own. 
 More work is now needed on these two dimensions of political opportunity 
structures, both to better articulate the mechanisms at play and to test their relevance 
to other cross-national and cross-campaign comparisons. However, focusing on the 
articulation between domestic and international political opportunities and on the way 
pre-existing (or concomitant) movements and frames may interfere with cross-border 
diffusion should help shed more light on a phenomenon still under-studied from a 
comparative perspective: the rise of transnational activism. 
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i The author would like to thank Miriam Allam for her efficient research assistance on 
the German case, and the two anonymous referees for Social Movement Studies for 
their helpful comments. 
 
ii       Work has since continued, notably with the establishment in April 2001 of 
follow up movement Jubilee Movement International.  
 
iii       The other being Japan, which later established its own Jubilee coalitions. 
 
iv   Eurodad (European Network on Debt and Development) is a network of 48 
development non-governmental organizations from 15 European countries. 
Throughout the campaign, Eurodad’s secretariat provided advice and support and 
circulated relevant information to member organizations. 
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v    After siding with the French refusal to cancel Iraq’s debts, Finance Minister Eichel 
declined to support Gordon Brown’s October 2004 initiative, on the grounds that it 
would not be acceptable to cancel the debts of African states even as the German 
people were asked to shoulder harsh social cuts (Tagesspiegel, 5 October 2004). 
 
vi  The March 2001 creation of a Paris Club web site, coupled with pledges of greater 
transparency by President Jean-Pierre Jouyet, would later be hailed as a significant 
breakthrough by campaign coordinators. 
 
vii       The demands of the Comité pour l'Annulation de la Dette du Tiers Monde 
(CADTM) range from the cancellation of Third World external debt to the conversion 
of military spending into social and cultural expenditures.  
 
viii  In 2003, the Evangelical and Catholic churches received euros 160mn from the 
federal government.  
 
ix  Data from national Finance Ministries, accessible at: 
"http://www.jubileeplus.org/databank/debttables/bilateral.htm"   
 
x      Within the CDI the government would cancel the remaining aid debts, worth 
£132 million of those poorer (lower-middle income) Commonwealth countries that 
would meet certain economic performance and good governance criteria.  As of 2002, 
12 countries had benefited from the initiative. 
 
xi      In 2001, the issue came 4th in the UK and 8th in the European panel, this time a 
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testimony to the particular impact of the Jubilee campaign in Britain. 
 
xii      This is notably asserted by Martin Dent, co-founder of the campaign: 'In our 
original committee we rejected a proposal that the name should be changed from 
'Jubilee 2000' to 'Debt-Free 2000', and, subsequently, we have derived enormous 
momentum from the support of all the churches' (Dent 1999: 32). 
 
xiii When asked why the French debt relief campaign had failed to replicate the success 
of the British one, CCFD coordinator Alex de la Forest-Divonne pointed to 
differences in both resources and tactics: ‘We do not have the same striking power 
[..]. Jubilee 2000 had more than twenty full-time staff in London, whereas we are only 
two, part-time. Jubilee 2000 used the media to the full, attracted stars like Bono, even 
produced its own TV ads’ (Libération, 19 June 2002). In 1999, Erlassjahr 2000 was 
employing five full time staff. 
 
 
